**Research Report** 

# Public Perceptions of CVE Policies and Attitudes Towards Reporting Concerns of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

### Public Perceptions of CVE Policies and Attitudes Towards Reporting Concerns of Radicalization in the Nordic Countries

© 2023 Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism Telephone: +45 72 14 27 00 Email: ekstremisme@us.dk www.stopekstremisme.dk / www.stopextremism.dk

This research report has been elaborated by a team of authors and published by Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism, which is part of the Danish Immigration Service. The responsibility for the contents and conclusions of the report rests with the authors alone.

### Authors:

- Christian Noer, Oluf Gøtzsche-Astrup and Lasse Lindekilde, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University
- Anna Maria Fjellman and Jennie Sivenbring, , Department of Education and Special Education, University of Gothenburg
- Tore Bjørgo, Oslo University and Norwegian Police University College
- Randi Solhjell and Ingvild Magnæs, Norwegian Police University College
- Håvard Haugstvedt and Yngve Carlsson, Oslo University
- Robin Andersson Malmros, School of Public Administration and The Segerstedt Institute, Gothenburg University March 2023

All rights reserved to the authors and the Centre for Documentation and Counter Extremism. The publication can be downloaded for free at www.stopekstremisme.dk or www.stopextremism.dk. The publication can be quoted with clear source reference.

### **Table of Content**

Forord ved Center for Dokumentation og Indsats mod Ekstremisme4
Sammenfatning på dansk4
Introduction5
Data6
Findings7
Descriptive analyses
Regression analyses
Discussion
Conclusion35
References

### Forord ved Center for Dokumentation og Indsats mod Ekstremisme

Center for Dokumentation og Indsats mod Ekstremisme (CDE) har valgt at udgive denne rapport fra et team af nordiske forskere, fordi den rummer væsentlige resultater og indsigter af betydning for, hvordan borgerne i de nordiske lande opfatter myndighedernes indsatser for at modvirke og forebygge ekstremisme, og hvordan disse opfattelser har en sammenhæng med borgernes vilje til at henvende sig til myndighederne, hvis de er bekymret for, at nogen de kender kan være involveret i ekstremisme. Udgivelsen sker også på baggrund af, at CDE og andre danske myndigheder over en længere årrække har samarbejdet med nogle af forskerne bag rapporten, ikke mindst professor Lasse Lindekilde fra Aarhus Universitet, der i forskellige sammenhænge har medvirket til at kvalificere og formidle myndighedernes indsats. Senest er dette sket i sammenhæng med opmærksomhedsindsats om ekstremisme i skoler og uddannelser, hvor Lasse Lindekildes forskning om læreres reaktioner ved bekymring om radikalisering samt om effekter af politiets beredskabsinstruks ved væbnede angreb har været væsentlige bidrag.

### Sammenfatning på dansk

Borgere og lokalsamfundet spiller en central rolle i arbejdet for at modvirke voldelig ekstremisme, da de kan hjælpe myndighederne med at opdage tilfælde af radikalisering ved at indberette bekymring herom. Denne rapport undersøger netop samspillet mellem borgere og myndigheder i forebyggelsen af voldelig ekstremisme. Vi undersøger borgernes holdning til indsatser, som sigter mod at imødegå voldelig ekstremisme, samt borgernes villighed til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Resultaterne bygger på nationalt repræsentative spørgeskemaer fra de fire nordiske lande Danmark, Sverige, Norge og Finland. Rapporten indeholder en række fund, som har relevans for arbejdet med forebyggelse af ekstremisme i praksis. For det første finder vi, at befolkningen på tværs af de fire lande har en høj grad af lighed i deres holdninger til indsatser imod voldelig ekstremisme og villighed til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Indsatser imod voldelig ekstremisme bliver i alle fire lande gennemsnitligt anset som legitime, mens borgerne i alle lande udviser mere moderat villighed til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Som følge af den høje grad af lighed på tværs af befolkningerne kan landene lære af hinanden og dele erfaringer med borgerrettede tiltag imod voldelig ekstremisme. For det andet finder vi en stærk sammenhæng mellem tillid til myndighederne og holdning til indsatser, der modvirker voldelig ekstremisme. Respondenter med lav tillid finder tiltag imod ekstremisme mindre legitime. Dette understreger vigtigheden af tillid til myndighederne i arbejdet med forebyggelse af ekstremisme. Praktikere som socialrådgivere, politibetjente og SSP-arbejdere har derfor en vigtig rolle i at modvirke potentielle negative holdninger over for indsatser imod ekstremisme samt i at opbygge tillid mellem borgere og myndighederne. For det tredje finder vi en stærk sammenhæng mellem holdning til indsatser, der modvirker ekstremisme og villighed til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Respondenter, der opfatter indsatser imod ekstremisme som legitime er mere villige til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Det er således en forudsætning, at borgerne anser indsatser imod ekstremisme som nødvendige, retfærdige og legitime for, at de er villige til at indberette bekymringer om radikalisering. Tillid til myndighederne og en opfattelse af at tiltag imod ekstremisme er legitime er altså afgørende for samspillet mellem borgere og myndigheder i arbejdet for at modvirke voldelig ekstremisme.

### Introduction

Interagency collaboration is a key component in the Nordic approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE). Building on models of interagency collaboration in crime prevention among police, social services and schools, CVE has developed as a policy area that combines the capacities of different public agencies and professional groups. The collaboration between schools, social services, and police is called the SSP model (school, social services, police) in Denmark, SSP(f) in Sweden, Anchor (Ankkuri) in Finland, and SLT in Norway. The rationale for interagency collaborations is simple: Violent extremism is a complex problem that requires multifaceted and flexible solutions, and only by pooling resources, expertise and information can we hope to counter violent extremism. In the Nordic countries, local interagency teams are set up to assess concrete cases of concern regarding radicalization and to devise and implement suitable responses. Despite some national and city-level differences in how CVE policies are framed and local interagency teams are organized (Sivenbring and Andersson Malmros 2019), the fundamental approach is similar. Likewise, the countries share a guiding view that the public and local communities play an important role in preventing violent extremism,

particularly by sharing concerns about radicalization with authorities. The perceived importance of public referrals centers on citizens' proximity to potentially vulnerable individuals and capacity to recognize changes in behaviors and attitudes.

Despite this common ground, little is known about how the public perceives the legitimacy of CVE policies and their attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities, including what predicts such perceptions and attitudes. This is problematic as public perceptions of CVE policies as fundamentally legitimate – appropriate, fair and proportional – are expected to be an important prerequisite for holding positive attitudes towards collaborating with authorities and reporting concerns of radicalization. Without public perceptions of CVE policies as fundamentally legitimate and positive attitudes towards reporting, local interagency CVE teams will face problems in identifying concerns of radicalization and implementing efficient solutions.

In this summary report, we contribute to closing this gap by reporting findings from national representative surveys with ordinary citizens in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland (N = 2421). Across countries, we investigate and compare perceptions of the legitimacy of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns about radicalization to authorities as well as the relationship between these factors. Furthermore, using regression analyses, we investigate what factors predict perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting concerns. The report draws on research project "Nordic Multiagency Approaches to Handling Extremism: Policies, Perceptions and Practices" (HEX-NA), funded by NordForsk (grant agreement number 87180).

In the following, we first outline our data and methodology and then present our findings in two main sections. One presents descriptive analyses of public perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization across the four countries. The other presents regression analyses of the predictors of perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting respectively for the pooled sample and for the individual countries. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for CVE practices and limitations of our study.

### Data

The data was collected through a web-based survey sent out via the polling company Epinion in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland. All samples are nationally representative of their respective populations. Data collection was carried out between October 8, 2019 and January 15, 2020. The Swedish-, Finnish-, Norwegian- and Danish-language surveys were translated to/from English by native speakers. All respondents in the survey are 18 years or older.

The dataset is used in Gøtzsche-Astrup, Lindekilde and Fjellmann (2021), who employ an experiment embedded in the survey manipulating the legitimacy of CVE policies. This report is based on the responses of the control group, meaning that all data in this report is observational and not influenced by the embedded experiment. After removing all respondents who are not in the control group from the dataset, the sample consists of 2,421 respondents. To ensure the quality of the data, we removed 37 respondents who indicated that they did not pay attention when taking the survey and 107 respondents who consistently answered the middle category (4 on a scale from 1 to 7) on all eight questions about the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies and all 13 questions about attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. The final sample consists of 2,277 respondents (587 from Denmark, 559 from Sweden, 527 from Norway and 604 from Finland). These samples are nationally representative on gender, age, education and region.

### Findings

In this section, we report the results of our analyses. The subsection "Descriptive analyses" reports distributions on our main variables of interest (perceived legitimacy of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in each country), and the subsection "Regression analyses" reports the results of a series of regression analyses with these main variables as dependent variables.

### Descriptive analyses Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies

The perceived legitimacy of CVE policies is measured by eight questions (see note in Table 1 for the exact wordings), which we use to construct a summary index on a scale from 0 to 1 ( $\alpha$  = 0.71). High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. Figures 1-4 below present the distributions on the index in the four countries. The figures reveal that the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies is relatively normally distributed in all four countries. The distributions also reveal that the respondents in the four countries are similarly distributed with most of the distribution between 0.5 and 0.8. The similarity between the four countries is supported

by a comparison of the means 0.64, 0.62, 0.64 and 0.65 in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland respectively (see notes in Figures 1-4). Substantially, the means above 0.5 show that citizens in the four countries find CVE policies relatively legitimate.




Figure 1. Distribution on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Denmark (index). Percent

**Note:** n = 587, M = 0.64, SD = 0.13. Index based on the eight items from Table 1. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.





Figure 2. Distribution on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Sweden (index). Percent

**Note:** n = 559, M = 0.62, SD = 0.13. Index based on the eight items from Table 1. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

Figure 3. Distribution on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Norway (index). Percent



**Note:** n = 527, M = 0.64, SD = 0.13. Index based on the eight items from Table 1. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.




Figure 4. Distribution on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Finland (index). Percent

**Note:** n = 604, M = 0.65, SD = 0.14. Index based on the eight items from Table 1. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

Table 1 below presents the distributions on the individual items from the index in each of the four countries. Items 3 (Authorities are too harsh) and 4 (Information sharing) score particularly high on perceived legitimacy. In Sweden, 71.6 % disagree that authorities are too harsh on individuals vulnerable to radicalization, and in Finland 83.1 % agree that open sharing of information between authorities is a good approach to preventing radicalization. In contrast, item 2 (Careful consideration) scores particularly low on perceived legitimacy with 56.2 % and 36.1 % in Denmark and Sweden respectively. Additionally, Sweden stands out with a particularly low perceived legitimacy on item 1 (Parties support prevention) and 2 (Careful consideration) compared to the three other countries. However, the differences almost even out when all items are aggregated into an index with Sweden's mean of 0.62 similar to 0.64, 0.64 and 0.65 in Denmark, Norway and Finland respectively. Therefore, we conclude that perceived legitimacy of CVE policies is very similar, on average, in the four countries.

	Der	nmark (n = 5	87)	Sw	eden (n = 5	59)	No	rway (n = 52	27)	Fin	land (n = 60	04)
	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Disagree	Neither	Agree
(1) Parties support prevention	8.5	23.5	68.0	29.3	22.0	48.7	16.3	18.4	65.3	14.2	19.5	66.2
(2) Careful consideration	13.6	30.2	56.2	37.2	26.7	36.1	16.5	26.8	56.7	17.9	24.0	58.1
(3) Authorities are too harsh*	68.7	24.5	6.8	71.6	20.6	7.9	52.0	33.6	14.4	65.7	25.0	9.3
(4) Information sharing	6.5	17.9	75.6	7.0	12.9	80.1	6.1	15.4	78.6	6.0	10.9	83.1
(5) Authorities discriminate*	50.8	34.2	15.0	57.6	26.3	16.1	48.0	35.1	16.9	57.0	28.0	15.1
(6) Information kept secure	10.1	45.0	45.0	16.1	46.9	37.0	8.9	46.9	44.2	10.4	35.1	54.5
(7) Further extremism*	51.1	35.1	13.8	52.1	25.8	22.2	54.1	30.9	15.0	38.6	43.9	17.5
(8) Authorities stigmatize*	40.2	41.9	17.9	44.9	38.5	16.6	44.4	34.5	21.1	54.3	25.8	19.9


Table 1. Distributions on questions about the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. Percent (within each country)

**Note:** \*The item is reversed in the index. All variables are recoded from a 7-point Likert scale to categorical variables with "Disagree" consisting of "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree", "Neither" consisting of "Neither agree nor disagree" and "Agree" consisting of "Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree". The variables are answers to the question: "Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements": (1) "Most political parties support authorities' radicalization prevention work", (2) "Authorities' work to prevent radicalization is a product of careful consideration", (3) "Authorities are too harsh on individuals vulnerable to radicalization, (4) "Open sharing of information between authorities (e.g. police, social services and schools) is a good approach to preventing radicalization", (5) "Authorities discriminate against ethnic and religious minorities in their work to prevent radicalization, (6) "Information shared with the authorities about individuals vulnerable to radicalization is kept secure and used responsibly", (7) "Authorities work to prevent radicalization is likely to push people further towards extremism and (8) "Authorities stigmatize ethnic and religious minorities in their work to prevent radicalization".


### Attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization

Attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization are measured by 13 items (see note in Table 2 for the exact wordings), which we use to construct a summary index on a scale from 0 to 1 ( $\alpha$  = 0.77). High values indicate positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. Figures 5-8 present the distributions on the index in the four countries. As for perceived legitimacy of CVE policies, attitudes towards reporting are normally distributed in all four countries. The respondents are also relatively similarly distributed across the four countries. However, the fact that most respondents are distributed around the theoretical middle between 0.4 and 0.6 in all four countries indicates a lower mean than for perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. The mean is 0.52 for Denmark, 0.52 for Sweden, 0.51 for Norway and 0.54 for Finland (see notes in Figures 5-8). The mean close to 0.5 indicates that the four countries have relatively mixed positive and negative attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization, and that the countries on average are very similar on this measure as well.

**Figure 5.** Distribution on attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in Denmark (index). Percent





**Note:** n = 587, M = 0.52, SD = 0.11. Index based on the 13 items from Table 2. High values indicate positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.




**Figure 6.** Distribution on attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in Sweden (index). Percent


**Note:** n = 559, M = 0.52, 0.12. Index based on the 13 items from Table 2. High values indicate positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.





**Note:** n = 527, M = 0.51, SD = 0.12. Index based on the 13 items from Table 2. High values indicate positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.





**Note:** n = 604, M = 0.54, SD = 0.13. Index based on the 13 items from Table 2. High values indicate positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.

Table 2 below presents distributions on the individual items from the index in each country. Items 9 (Trust police) and 11 (Concern safety of others) score particularly high on positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in the four countries. In Denmark, 60.0 % are likely to trust the police to handle a report on radicalization sensitively, and 70.9 % in Finland are concerned about the safety and security of others if they do not report. Thus, trust in authorities and concerns about the safety of others are particularly important when citizens consider whether to report radicalization. Some of the largest barriers to reporting concerns about radicalization are items 1 (Innocent person) and 6 (Uncertainty of proper reporting). 61.5 % in Norway are likely to be concerned that an innocent person might get into trouble due to a report, and 64.4 % are likely to be uncertain how to report a concern of radicalization properly. Additionally, Table 2 reveals some country differences on the individual items. In Sweden, 30.4 % are likely to agree with item 3 (Stigmatize by reporting), which is markedly lower than in the other countries, meaning that citizens in Sweden are less concerned about stigmatizing a person when reporting concerns of radicalization. In Finland, 48.0 % are unlikely to agree with item 13 (Worry about others' thoughts), which is markedly higher than in the other countries, meaning that citizens in Finland worry less about others' thoughts when reporting concerns of radicalization.

	Der	nmark (n = 5	87)	Sw	Sweden (n = 559)		No	Norway (n = 527)		Finland (n = 604)		
	Unlikely	Neither	Likely	Unlikely	Neither	Likely	Unlikely	Neither	Likely	Unlikely	Neither	Likely
(1) Innocent person*	19.6	19.4	61.0	31.5	17.7	50.8	24.7	13.9	61.5	33.4	16.9	49.7
(2) Damage relationship*	24.7	25.2	50.1	25.9	21.1	53.0	24.5	21.3	54.3	38.4	24.7	36.9
(3) Stigmatize by reporting*	26.6	32.7	40.7	39.4	30.2	30.4	33.8	26.9	39.3	40.9	18.5	40.6
(4) Authorities' resources*	46.7	26.9	26.4	56.5	20.9	22.5	48.4	18.2	33.4	48.2	21.5	30.3
(5) Inconvenience*	37.5	28.8	33.7	29.9	20.0	50.1	25.6	19.2	55.2	31.0	19.5	49.5
(6) Uncertainty of proper reporting*	18.4	22.1	59.5	20.2	21.6	58.1	13.9	19.4	66.8	16.4	19.2	64.4
(7) Taken seriously	19.4	32.5	48.0	26.8	25.2	47.9	23.0	30.0	47.1	25.5	24.7	49.8
(8) Trust authority	16.0	27.9	56.0	27.5	27.0	45.4	24.1	30.4	45.5	20.5	24.5	55.0
(9) Trust police	15.0	25.0	60.0	21.5	22.0	56.5	19.7	20.5	59.8	15.4	24.7	59.9
(10) Concern personal safety*	27.3	29.8	42.9	21.1	20.4	58.5	29.0	21.3	49.7	31.3	20.4	48.3
(11) Concern safety of others	10.1	22.5	67.5	12.3	19.3	68.3	11.0	17.1	71.9	14.6	14.6	70.9
(12) Recognizing radicalization	19.1	43.4	37.5	26.5	31.5	42.0	26.6	37.8	35.7	38.6	24.7	36.8
(13) Worry about others' thoughts*	32.2	32.4	35.4	34.5	26.1	39.4	32.8	27.1	40.0	48.0	27.3	24.7

Table 2. Distributions on questions about attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. Percent (within each country)

**Note:** \*The item is reversed in the index. All variables are recoded from a 7-point Likert scale to categorical variables with "Unlikely" consisting of "Extremely unlikely", "Moderately unlikely", "Moderately unlikely", "Moderately likely", "Moderately likely", "Moderately likely" and "Slightly unlikely". The variables are answers to the question: "Please indicate how likely you would be to think/feel the following when considering whether to report concerns about radicalization": (1) "concerned that I may get an innocent person into trouble", (2) "worry that it would damage my relationship with that person", (3) "concerned that reporting the person could stigmatise them/their community", (4) "worry that it is not a worthwhile use of the authorities' resources", (5) "concerned it would inconvenience me", (6) "uncertain how to properly report it", (7) "confident that my report would be taken seriously", (8) "trust in the local authority to handle the case sensitively", (9) "trust in the police to handle the case sensitively", (10) "concerned about my own personal safety and security", (11) "concerned about the safety and security of others if I did not report (i.e. the individual eventually went onto commit an act of terrorism)", (12) "confidence that I know how to effectively recognise vulnerabilities to radicalization (i.e. I know when to contact authorities)" and (13) "worry that others would think I was judging unfairly if I reported someone from a different background to me".

### **Regression analyses**

## What predicts perceived legitimacy of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization?

This section reports the results of the regression analyses with perceived legitimacy of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization as dependent variables. The regression analyses are conducted on the full sample and separately within each country. The independent variables in the regressions are presented in three main blocks: sociodemographic variables (sex, education, age), trust and justice variables (institutional trust and procedural justice), and personal experience variables (experienced extremism in neighborhood, experienced extremism among acquaintances, experienced discrimination, and terrorism anxiety). Additionally, we include perceived legitimacy of CVE policies as a control variable in the regression with attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization as the independent variable, as perceived legitimacy is theoretically expected to shape attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.

#### Measures

In the following, we present the measures of the independent variables in the regressions. Sex is measured with the question "What is your sex?" (female = 0, male = 1). The category "Other" is recoded as missing. Education is measured with the ISCED categories going from "Primary education" (Level 1) to "Doctoral or equivalent level" (Level 8). To measure age, we asked respondents to indicate their birth year.

Institutional trust and procedural justice are measured with two summary indexes ( $\alpha = 0.88$  and  $\alpha = 0.78$ ). Institutional justice consists of the three items: "I trust authorities to make decisions in a fair way", "I trust the authorities to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities", and "You can't really trust the authorities to do the right thing". Procedural justice consists of the three items: "The police use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone", "The police make decisions based on facts, rather than their own personal opinions", and "The police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected". All items are measured on a Likert-scale from 1 (Very inaccurate) to 5 (Very accurate). Both indexes are rescaled from 0 (Low institutional trust/procedural justice) to 1 (High institutional trust/procedural justice).

To measure experienced extremism, respondents are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (No, not at all) to 7 (Yes, a big problem) whether there is a problem in their neighborhood with: "People promoting extreme political or religious views". The item is rescaled from 0 to 1. Experienced extremism among acquaintances is measured with a summary index ( $\alpha = 0.90$ ) consisting of the three items: "Have you ever been concerned that somebody you know has been doing the following?" (1) "Reading online extremist propaganda", (2) "Frequenting radical groups", and (3) "Posting extreme rhetoric online". All items are measured on a Likertscale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always). The index is rescaled from 0 to 1. Experienced discrimination is measured on a Likert-scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always) with the question: "Have you personally experienced discrimination from authorities?" The item is rescaled from 0 to 1. Terrorism anxiety is measured with an index ( $\alpha = 0.83$ ) consisting of the following four items measured on a Likert-scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree): "Thinking about terrorism makes me anxious", "I am concerned that DK/SW/NO/FIN might suffer another terrorist attack in the next three months", "It is likely that I or someone I know will be a victim of terrorism in the next six months", and "It is likely that the DK/SW/NO/FIN will suffer a terrorist attack in the next three months". The index is rescaled from 0 (Low terrorism anxiety) to 1 (High terrorism anxiety).

### Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies

### Pooled sample

Table 3 below presents the results of the regression analysis with perceived legitimacy of CVE policies as the dependent variable for the combined date from all four countries. In the full model (Model 3) containing all independent variables of interest, all coefficients are statistically significant. The sociodemographic variables indicate that men (coefficient: 0.019), higher educated respondents (coefficient: 0.006) and older respondents (coefficient: 0.009) perceive the legitimacy of CVE policies as higher than women, lower educated and younger respondents do.

A possible explanation of the positive correlations for education and age is that trust in the system increases with education and age. As detailed below, institutional trust and procedural justice strongly predict the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. A possible explanation of the positive correlation for men is that men tend to be more restrictive on immigration

17

issues, and since CVE policies are often perceived to target Muslim immigrant communities, their perceived legitimacy of CVE policies might be shaped by their opinions on immigration.

Also the second block of independent variables are statistically significantly correlated with perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. An increase by 1 in institutional trust and procedural justice increases the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies by 0.11 and 0.17 respectively (Model 3). Thus, respondents with higher institutional trust and procedural justice perceive the legit-imacy of CVE policies as higher. Theoretically, this pattern is expected, as higher trust in authorities and institutions is seen as a precondition for law abidance and collaboration with the police (Tyler, 2007). Additionally, institutional trust and procedural justice are some of the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. This is evident when we look at the increase in the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> from 0.05 in Model 1, which only includes sociodemographic variables, to 0.23 in Model 2, which includes institutional trust and procedural justice as explanatory variables.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male (ref.: female)	0.006	0.011*	0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	0.010***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.012***	0.012***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Institutional trust		0.113***	0.112***
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Procedural justice		0.181***	0.166***
		(0.015)	(0.015)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.039***
			(0.011)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.068***
			(0.016)
Experienced discrimination			-0.089***
			(0.020)
Terrorism anxiety			0.045***
			(0.012)
Constant	0.532***	0.381***	0.398***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.013)

Table 3. Regression on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. Pooled sample

Observations	2220	2220	2220
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.050	0.227	0.253

**Note:** \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

The third block of predictors are also significantly correlated with perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. However, experienced extremism in neighborhood, experienced extremism among acquaintances and experienced discrimination are negatively correlated with perceived legitimacy of CVE policies, whereas terrorism anxiety has a positive correlation. Going from 0 to 1 on experienced extremism in one's neighborhood and among acquaintances significantly decreases the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies by 0.04 and 0.07 respectively. A possible explanation is that people who have experienced extremism might also have bad experiences with CVE policies. An increase from 0 to 1 on experienced discrimination decreases perceived legitimacy of CVE policies by 0.09, which is theoretically expected as bad experiences with authorities in terms of discrimination probably decrease support of the authorities who carry out CVE policies. Lastly, an increase from 0 to 1 on terrorism anxiety significantly increases the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies by 0.05. This pattern is expected as more anxiety about terrorism plausibly increases support for countering terrorism.

### National samples

Tables 4-7 below report the results of the corresponding regression analyses in the four countries separately. Overall, all the variables consistently predict perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in the same direction in the four countries as in the pooled sample. However, for some of the variables, coefficients and significance vary across the countries compared to the pooled sample. One explanation is that the sample size is smaller in the separate regressions (Tables 4-7), meaning that in some cases, the coefficient, even though it is the same, becomes insignificant due to higher statistical uncertainty. For example, the coefficient for education is the same in the full sample (Table 3) and in Denmark (Table 4), but it is insignificant in Denmark (Table 4). The other possible explanation is that there are variations between the four countries. Below, we will review the three blocks of regressions in the national samples.

All sociodemographic variables positively predict perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in all countries but vary in terms of significance. Sex and age have the largest impact on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Denmark with significant coefficients (Table 4). In Sweden,

19

education is the only significant predictor in the full model (Table 5, Model 3). In Norway, age has a significant influence (0.014) (Table 6). In Finland, all sociodemographic variables still have a significant influence on perceived legitimacy of CVE (Table 7).

Institutional trust and procedural justice positively and significantly predict perceived legitimacy in all four countries. This underlines the impact of institutional trust and procedural justice on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies, as it shows that the coefficients in the pooled sample are not driven by specific countries. Institutional trust and procedural justice remain the most important predictors of perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in all four countries.

The experience variables (experienced extremism in neighborhood, experienced extremism among acquaintances, experienced discrimination) consistently and negatively predict perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in all countries but are not significant in all countries. In Denmark, experienced extremism in the neighborhood significantly decreases perceived legitimacy. In Sweden, experienced discrimination is the only significant predictor. In Norway, experienced extremism in the neighborhood and among acquaintances has a significant negative impact on perceived legitimacy. In Finland, experienced extremism among acquaintances is a significant predictor. Terrorism anxiety consistently and positively predicts perceived legitimacy. These coefficients are only significant in Denmark and Finland. Thus, the results indicate that citizens in the four countries offer relatively similar explanations of their perceived legitimacy of CVE policies with smaller variations in the significance of the predictors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male (ref.: female)	0.016	0.024*	0.034**
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	0.008	0.006	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.010**	0.009**	0.007*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.130***	0.125***
		(0.029)	(0.029)
Procedural justice		0.189***	0.174***
		(0.030)	(0.031)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.059*

Table 4. Regression on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Denmark

			(0.025)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.054
			(0.039)
Experienced discrimination			-0.055
			(0.041)
Terrorism anxiety			0.070**
			(0.023)
Constant	0.545***	0.368***	0.371***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Observations	578	578	578
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.229	0.248

**Note:** \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male (ref.: female)	0.005	0.006	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	0.012***	0.008*	0.010**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.009**	0.009**	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.123***	0.121***
		(0.023)	(0.023)
Procedural justice		0.120***	0.093**
		(0.032)	(0.031)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.029
			(0.023)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.047
			(0.030)
Experienced discrimination			-0.140***
			(0.035)
Terrorism anxiety			0.032
			(0.023)
Constant	0.524***	0.412***	0.443***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Observations	556	556	556
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.043	0.155	0.192

 Table 5. Regression on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Sweden

**Note:** \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male (ref.: female)	-0.009	-0.001	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Education	0.006	0.002	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.017***	0.018***	0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.074**	0.074**
		(0.025)	(0.024)
Procedural justice		0.215***	0.205***
		(0.028)	(0.028)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.052*
			(0.025)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.095**
			(0.031)
Experienced discrimination			-0.067
			(0.041)
Terrorism anxiety			0.036
			(0.025)
Constant	0.527***	0.369***	0.395***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Observations	492	492	492
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.063	0.246	0.281

Table 6. Regression on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Norway

**Note:** \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male (ref.: female)	0.012	0.015	0.022*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.011**	0.007*	0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.014***	0.011**	0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.129***	0.126***
		(0.028)	(0.028)
Procedural justice		0.176***	0.171***
		(0.029)	(0.029)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.036
			(0.021)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.082**
			(0.031)
Experienced discrimination			-0.071
			(0.045)
Terrorism anxiety			0.060*
			(0.025)
Constant	0.531***	0.380***	0.383***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Observations	594	594	594
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.258	0.278

Table 7. Regression on perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Finland

**Note:** \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 based on two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. High values indicate high perceived legitimacy of CVE policies.

### Attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization

### Pooled sample

Table 8 below presents the results of the regression analyses with attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization as the dependent variable with the pooled sample. In Model 4, all sociodemographic variables have statistically significant coefficients. Men have more positive attitudes towards reporting, higher educated respondents have more negative attitudes towards reporting, and older respondents have more positive attitudes towards reporting.

The trust and procedural justice variables have a significant impact on attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in Model 2 and 3. Increasing institutional trust and procedural justice by 1 increases attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization with 0.04

and 0.06 respectively. However, the coefficients decrease significantly when perceived legitimacy of CVE policies is included in Model 4. This is expected as institutional trust and procedural justice were some of the strongest predictors of perceived legitimacy (cf. Table 3). Therefore, including perceived legitimacy removes a lot of the variance that is correlated with institutional trust and procedural justice.

The variables in the third block reveal more mixed results. Experienced extremism in neighborhood and experienced discrimination are insignificant in Model 3 and 4. The coefficient for experienced extremism among acquaintances is statistically significant and negative, meaning that respondents who have experienced extremism among acquaintances have more negative attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. A possible explanation is that people who have experienced extremism might also have bad experiences with the consequences for people being reported due to concerns of radicalization. However, this coefficient becomes insignificant when perceived legitimacy of CVE policies is included in the model. As with institutional trust and procedural justice, this is due to the correlation between experienced extremism among acquaintances and perceived legitimacy of CVE policies (cf. Table 3). Terrorism anxiety is the only factor within this block of variables that stays significant in Model 4. Increasing terrorism anxiety by 1 increases negative attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization with 0.05. This finding is unexpected, but a possible explanation is that high levels of terrorism anxiety may paralyze people and keep them from engaging with anything related to radicalization.

Lastly, Model 4 shows that the perceived legitimacy of CVE policies has a large and statistically significant impact on attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. Increasing perceived legitimacy by 1 increases attitudes towards reporting by 0.29. As mentioned, this fits our expectations, as perceived legitimacy is expected to shape the attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization. Substantially, this means that in order to make people more positive towards reporting concerns of radicalization, it is important that they find CVE policies legitimate in general.

25

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male (ref.: female)	0.027***	0.029***	0.026***	0.021***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Institutional trust		0.045***	0.039**	0.007
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Procedural justice		0.059***	0.059***	0.012
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			0.005	0.016
			(0.012)	(0.011)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.036*	-0.017
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Experienced discrimination			-0.001	0.025
			(0.021)	(0.020)
Terrorism anxiety			-0.042***	-0.054***
			(0.012)	(0.012)
Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies				0.286***
				(0.021)
Constant	0.445***	0.392***	0.421***	0.307***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Observations	2220	2220	2220	2220
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.051	0.076	0.083	0.153

### National samples

Tables 9-12 below present the regression analyses in the four countries separately. As for perceived legitimacy of CVE policies, most of the findings in the pooled sample are similar in the national samples with variations in significance levels. Among the sociodemographic variables, gender and age consistently and positively predict attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in all countries except Sweden where gender is negative but insignificant. In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, age is a significant predictor. In Norway and Finland, gender remains significant. The coefficient for education reveals more mixed results as it negatively and significantly predicts attitudes towards reporting in Denmark but is insignificant in the other countries.

Institutional trust and procedural justice predict attitudes towards reporting positively in three of the countries as in the pooled sample. In Sweden, institutional trust has a statistically significant impact on attitudes towards reporting before perceived legitimacy is included in the model (Table 10, Model 2 and 3). In Norway and Finland, procedural justice correlates significantly with attitudes towards reporting, and in Finland, the correlation is significant when perceived legitimacy is included (Table 12, model 4). In Sweden, procedural justice remains an insignificant predictor of attitudes towards reporting. Thus, most of the results from the pooled sample are reflected in the national samples, although the significance levels change in some of the countries.

In the third block of variables, experienced extremism in neighborhood, among acquaintances and experienced discrimination are insignificant predictors in three of the countries as in the pooled sample. However, in Sweden experienced discrimination positively and significantly predicts attitudes towards reporting, which is a surprising finding. Terrorism anxiety consistently and negatively predicts attitudes towards reporting in all countries. In Denmark and Finland, these coefficients are significant.

Lastly, but probably most importantly, perceived legitimacy of CVE policies positively and significantly predicts attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in all four countries. It almost doubles the explained variance in all countries when perceived legitimacy is included as an explanatory variable. This underlines the large impact of perceived legitimacy on attitudes towards reporting. Thus, both the pooled and the national samples reveal that perceived legitimacy is the main positive driver behind Scandinavian citizens' attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization.

27

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male (ref.: female)	0.030**	0.032**	0.028**	0.018
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Education	-0.005	-0.006	-0.007*	-0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.052	0.038	0.000
		(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Procedural justice		0.029	0.034	-0.019
		(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.031	-0.014
			(0.023)	(0.022)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			0.003	0.020
			(0.037)	(0.035)
Experienced discrimination			0.003	0.020
			(0.039)	(0.037)
Terrorism anxiety			-0.059**	-0.081***
			(0.022)	(0.021)
Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies				0.303***
				(0.037)
Constant	0.456***	0.413***	0.450***	0.338***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Observations	578	578	578	578
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.090	0.104	0.116	0.206

Table 9	Regression on	attitudes towards	reporting	concerns of	radicalization	in Donmark
Table 3.	regression on	attitudes towards	reporting	concerns or	Taulcalization	III Defiifiark

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male (ref.: female)	0.003	0.004	0.001	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.050*	0.051*	0.019
		(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Procedural justice		-0.015	-0.009	-0.034
		(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			0.007	0.014
			(0.023)	(0.023)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.038	-0.025
			(0.031)	(0.030)
Experienced discrimination			0.042	0.079*
			(0.037)	(0.036)
Terrorism anxiety			-0.022	-0.031
			(0.023)	(0.023)
Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies				0.268***
				(0.043)
Constant	0.448***	0.437***	0.443***	0.324***
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Observations	556	556	556	556
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.031	0.030	0.094

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male (ref.: female)	0.025*	0.028**	0.028*	0.025*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Age	0.017***	0.017***	0.016***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Institutional trust		0.029	0.027	0.005
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Procedural justice		0.078**	0.078**	0.019
		(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			0.023	0.038
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.038	-0.011
			(0.033)	(0.032)
Experienced discrimination			-0.018	0.001
			(0.043)	(0.041)
Terrorism anxiety			-0.019	-0.029
			(0.026)	(0.025)
Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies				0.287***
				(0.046)
Constant	0.420***	0.361***	0.379***	0.266***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Observations	492	492	492	492
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.090	0.088	0.154

Table 11. Regression on attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization in Norway

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male (ref.: female)	0.048***	0.049***	0.047***	0.041***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Education	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.010**	0.009*	0.007*	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Institutional trust		0.030	0.017	-0.017
		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Procedural justice		0.125***	0.116***	0.069*
		(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Experienced extremism neighborhood			-0.002	0.008
			(0.023)	(0.022)
Experienced extremism acquaintances			-0.063	-0.041
			(0.033)	(0.032)
Experienced discrimination			-0.083	-0.063
			(0.047)	(0.046)
Terrorism anxiety			-0.059*	-0.075**
			(0.027)	(0.026)
Perceived legitimacy of CVE policies				0.271***
				(0.042)
Constant	0.462***	0.382***	0.444***	0.340***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Observations	594	594	594	594
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.105	0.128	0.183

### Discussion

The above findings suggest that both public perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization are very similar across the four countries. This is not surprising as national CVE efforts are organized around local inter-agency teams representing schools, police and social authorities, which collaborate to assess cases of concern regarding radicalization (Solhjell 2021; Sivenbring and Andersson Malmros 2019; Hemmingsen 2015; Lindekilde 2015). However, the degree of cross-country similarities is remarkable, as extant research points to national differences in terms of CVE policy discourse. In their analysis of policy and legal documents, Sivenbring and Andersson Malmros (2019) show that scored according to a distinction between a "societal security logic" (CVE policies are primarily framed as keeping society safe) and a "social care logic" (CVE policies are primarily framed as safeguarding vulnerable youth), Denmark is closest to the "societal security logic", Sweden to the "social care logic", and Norway and Finland are in between. Our findings suggest that these national differences at the level of policy discourse do not translate into differences in public perceptions of CVE policy or attitudes towards reporting.

Our finding that citizens in all four countries, on average, perceive CVE policies as quite legitimate confirms studies that show that general political legitimacy is very high in the Nordic countries (Prado-Romaán et al 2016; Lappi-Seppälä and Tonry 2011). Nordic citizens tend to believe that political decisions made by the political system are fair, appropriate and implemented in a just manner. Likewise, the finding that perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy are most strongly predicted by institutional trust and procedural justice is in line with previous research (Parker, Lindekilde and Smith forthcoming). Citizens' experiences of authorities' trustworthiness and fair implementation of policies in one area strongly influence perceptions of policies in another.

The clearest finding in our study is that perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy consistently predict attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization so that high perceived legitimacy correlates with positive attitudes towards reporting concerns to authorities. This finding supports previous research with similar conclusions from other countries (Parker, Lindekilde and Smith forthcoming; Parker, Gøtzsche-Astrup and Lindekilde 2020). A key prerequisite for public reporting of concerns of radicalization to authorities is a perception of CVE efforts as necessary, appropriate, fair and effective (Gøtzsche-Astrup, Lindekilde and Fjellman 2021).

32

We find that terrorism anxiety is positively correlated to CVE policy legitimacy perceptions but negatively correlated with attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities. Fear of terrorism probably makes people think that CVE efforts are legitimate and necessary but surprisingly it does not lead to a positive attitude towards reporting. One might think that fear of terrorism would make citizens more attentive to potential terror risks and, thus, more willing to report concerns to authorities. However, it is also possible that high levels of anxiety about terrorism paralyze them and make them passive rather than proactive. Combined, these findings suggest that authorities should be mindful of a fear-based approach to framing CVE to the public.

What are the implications of these findings for practitioners working with CVE efforts in the Nordic countries? A general implication is that practitioners can learn from each other across country-specific experiences. Given the high degree of similarity in public perceptions of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization, it seems likely that initiatives that are effective in one country will also work elsewhere. For example, if efforts to frame CVE policies as "social care" increase perceived legitimacy of CVE policies in Norway, they are likely to do so in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Likewise, if particular practices of information sharing regarding CVE are deemed problematic and illegitimate by the public in one country, this is likely to be the case in other countries.

Practitioners working to implement CVE policies should care considerably about general institutional trust and procedural justice perceptions in the public. These factors are key to CVE policy legitimacy perceptions, and such perceptions are key for positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities. If, for example, negative experiences of institutional discrimination and implementation of CVE policies in practice lead to a drop in general institutional trust and procedural justice, collaboration with authorities regarding CVE is likely to be damaged. Thus, the reputation of CVE practices in affected communities matters. Implementing CVE policies is not only about handling concrete cases of concern but also about managing public perceptions. Local actors on the front lines of the welfare state such as social workers, local police officers and street workers are key to mitigating potential negative CVE sentiments and building trust. In this context, success stories and stories of CVE failure are important. For example, bad press about CVE policies and implementation practices can be damaging to both public CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting and must be addressed locally.

33

Furthermore, our findings point to the potential of securing positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities by boosting public perceptions of CVE policies as legitimate. As indicated, this can be done by reacting to negative sentiments. However, it can also be done by proactively framing CVE policies in ways that resonate with the public. Extant research suggests that framing CVE efforts in terms of safeguarding vulnerable youth from destroying their life is particularly effective when addressed to "intimate" audiences, i.e. people who know individuals of concern or are close to problems of radicalization locally (Parker, Lindekilde and Smith forthcoming; Grossman 2019; Thomas et al. 2017). Both local and national authorities working with CVE in practice could benefit from investing in building public CVE "frame resonance" (McCammon 2013).

The findings of this summary report contribute to our knowledge of public perceptions of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting radicalization concerns to authorities in the Nordic countries. As suggested, obtaining detailed knowledge is crucial given the centrality of collaboration between the public and authorities to the Nordic model of CVE. However, our study has limitations. First, although our sample is nationally representative of the populations in the four countries studied, the sample sizes are limited, which affects the statistical power of our analyses and the robustness of some findings regarding predictors of both CVE policy legitimacy perceptions and attitudes towards reporting at the national level. This lack of statistical power is likely to have contributed to our inability to replicate certain findings regarding, for example, experiences of discrimination and radicalization found when the pooled sample was analyzed at the individual country level. Second, while the regression analyses reported here provide important indications of what factors matter for public perceptions of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting, our analyses are correlational rather than causal. For example, CVE policy legitimacy perceptions correlate positively with attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities, but this does not mean that legitimacy perceptions cause reporting attitudes. Third, and related, we have only measured attitudes towards reporting in terms of potential drivers and barriers of such behavior. We have not measured reporting behavior intentions or reporting behavior as such. While we expect positive attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities to correlate with actual reporting behaviors, the degree to which such attitudes translate into actual behavior is an empirical question.

### Conclusion

In this summary report, we have reported findings from a set of nationally representative surveys in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland regarding the public's perceptions of the legitimacy of CVE policies and attitudes towards reporting concerns about radicalization to authorities. Overall, we find that both items are very similar across the four countries. On average, citizens in the four Nordic countries perceive CVE policies as quite legitimate but express more mixed attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization to authorities. Some national differences at the level of individual items can be identified, but these are small when we look at mean scores. Likewise, we find that the pattern of predictors of perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy and attitudes towards reporting are similar across countries. Most importantly, we consistently find that perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy predict attitudes towards reporting concerns of radicalization so that perceived high legitimacy correlates with positive attitudes towards reporting concerns to authorities. Perceptions of CVE policy legitimacy stand out as the strongest predictor of reporting attitudes and are most strongly predicted by institutional trust and procedural justice: the higher institutional trust and perceived procedural justice, the higher perceived legitimacy of CVE policies. In short, these findings underline the importance of general trust in authorities and specific perceptions of CVE policies as legitimate for public attitudes towards collaborating with authorities by reporting concerns of radicalization.

### References

Gøtzsche-Astrup, O., Lindekilde, L. and Fjellman, A.-M. (2021). Perceived Legitimacy of CVE Policies and the Willingness to Report Concerns of Radicalization to Authorities in the Nordic Countries. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, <u>https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1972977</u>.

Grossman, M. (2019). When the "right thing to do" feels so wrong: Australian Muslim perspectives on "intimates" reporting to authorities about violent extremism. In Esposito J., Iner D. (eds) *Islamophobia and Radicalization*, 203-222. Springer.

Hemmingsen, A. S. (2015). An introduction to the Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalization (No. 2015: 15). DIIS report.

- Lappi-Seppälä, T., and Tonry, M. (2011). Crime, criminal justice, and criminology in the Nordic countries. *Crime and Justice* 40(1), 1-32.
- Lindekilde, L. 2015. Dansk forebyggelse af ekstremisme og radikalisering 2009 2014: Udviklingstendenser og fremtidige udfordringer. *Politica* 47(3): 424-444.

- McCammon, H. (2013). Resonance, frame. *The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of social and political movements*.
- Parker, David, Lasse Lindekilde and Benjamin Smith (forthcoming). Understanding Public Intentions to Report Radicalisation: A cross-country analysis of the UK and Denmark."
- Parker, David, Lindekilde, Lasse and Gøtzsche-Astrup, Oluf. 2020. Recognising and Responding to Radicalisation at the "Frontline": Assessing the capability of school teachers to recognise and respond to radicalisation, *British Educational Research Journal* 47(3): 634-653.
- Prado-Román, C., Blanco-González, A., Díez-Martín, F and Payne, G. (2016). Building the Index of State Legitimacy in Baltic and Nordic Countries. *ESIC Market. Economic & Business Journal* 47(3).
- Sivenbring, J. and Andersson Malmros, R. (2019). *Mixing logics. Multiagency approaches for countering violent extremism*. Gothenburg: the Segerstedtinstitute.
- Solhjell, Randi (2021) Practices in Multiagency Collaboration against Violent Extremism at the City Level: Nordic Approaches. Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute Proceedings 77(1): 13.
- Thomas, P., Grossman, M., Miah, S. and Christmann, K. (2017). *Community reporting thresholds*. Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST).
- Tyler, T. R. (2007). *Psychology and the design of legal institutions*. Wolf Legal Publishers.